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156 NOTE
MINNESOTA CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A CRITIQUE
OF THE FIXED CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS
Most states, and the Federal Government, have established fixed
statutory limits on the amount a candidate or political party may
spend during a political campaign.1 The present system of fixed
limitations was incorporated into the Minnesota Corrupt Practices
Act in 19122 and remains substantially unchanged. This type of
legislation has been widely criticized. 3
The purposes of this Note are to examine the effectiveness of
existing state legislation, and, further, to consider the advisability
of retaining fixed campaign expenditure limitations in the Minne-
sota Corrupt Practices Act in the light of the purposes underlying
such legislation and the practical and legal obstacles which arise
in attempting to achieve enforceable ceilings.
PROVISIONS AND PURPOSES OF THE MINNESOTA CORRUt'T
PRACTICES ACT
Prosts O is
The Minnesota Corrupt Practices Act incorporates most of
the campaign fund regulations found in the Minnesota statutes. The
provision with which this Note is primarily concerned is § 211.06
which sets a fixed limit on the total expenditures that can be made
"by or on behalf" of a candidate during primary and general elec-
tions.4 The candidate may select a personal campaign committeer
1. For a breakdown of state legislation controlling campaign expendi-
tures see Bottomly, Corrupt Practices ti Political Campaigns, 30 B. U. L.
Rev. 331, 350-351 (1950). Limits are set on expenditures by congressional
candidates, 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 2 U. S. C. § 248 (1952), anti on iational
political committees. 18 U. S. C. § 609 (1952).
2. Limits were established on the candidates expenditures. Minn. Gen.
Laws 1912, c. 3, § 5, and on the state central committees of any political
party. Minn. Gen. Laws 1912, c. 3, § 25(3). Under earlier legislation, limuita-
tions varied according to the number of votes cast in the last election for the
particular office. Minn. Gen. Laws 1895, c. 277, § 6.
3. See Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 559-561 (3d ed.
1952), Overacker, Money in Elections 343-348 (1932), Emory, A Corrupt
Practices Act for Maryland, 4 Md. L. Rev. 248, 258 (1940) Mcllenry.
Present Party Organzation and Finance, 283 Annals 122, 126 (Sept. 1952)
4. Minn. Stat. § 211.06 (1953) reads as follows "No disbursement shall
be made and no obligation, express or implied, to make such disbursement.
shall be incurred by or on behalf of any candidate for any office under the
constitution or laws of this state, or under the ordinance of any town or
municipality of this state in his campaign for nomination and election, which
shall be in the aggregate in excess of the amounts herein specified (I) For
governor, $7,000, (2) For other state officers, $3,500, (3) For state senator.
$800; (4) For member of house of representatives, $600; (5) For presidential
elector-at-large, $500, and fpr presidential elector for any congressional dis-
trict, $100;" (6) (this section provides that any candidate not mentioned
above shall be limited to an amount equalling one-third of the annual salarv
of the office to which he aspires. If the office is non-salaried, $100 is the
expenditure limit)
5. Minn. Stat. § 211.17 (1953).
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which may spend any amount he authorizes up to the expenditure
limit assigned to the candidate.6 Also, the state central committee
of each political party is limited to expenditures of $10,000 in any
election.7 Certain types of expenditures are prohibited,8 and, in
addition, a list of permissible expenditures is set out for the candi-
dates9 and for the candidate's personal campaign committee or
party committee.10 Corporations may not contribute to "promote
or defeat the candidacy of any person."' U
Public disclosure regulations require that candidates, personal
committees, and party committees file a statement itemizing con-
tributions and expenditures before and after each primary and
general election. Other "political committees" are required to file
statements with the local county auditor but once after each primary
and general election, and this report is required to show only total
receipts and expenditures."
The county attorney is principally responsible for enforcing the
criminal provisions of the act.1 3 Violation of the Corrupt Practices
Act may result in a fine, imprisonment, or both.1 4 Further, if the
person convicted is an elected official, the court shall issue a supple-
mental order declaring such person to have forfeited the office which
is then deemed vacant 1 5
In addition to these criminal sanctions, any 25 voters, or the
defeated candidate, may-file a petition in thedistrict court to contest
the election of the successful candidate. If a violation of the act is
proven, the nomination or election is annulled."
Purposes
The strongest reason supporting limits on campaign expendi-
tures would seem to be that a candidate with resources in excess
of reasonable needs may, by spending this additional amount, gain
6. Minn. Stat. § 21125 (1953).
7. Minn Stat. §211.26(2) (1953).
8. Minn. Stat. §§ 210.16, 211.11 (1953) (treating by candidates pro-
hibited) ; Minn. Stat. §§ 210.03, 210.04 (1953) (bribery prohibited) ; Minn.
Stat § 211.14 (1953) (certain election day expenses prohibited).
9. Minn. Stat. § 211.02 (1953).
10. Minn. Stat. § 211.18 (1953).
11. Minn. Stat § 211.27 (1953).
12. Minn. Stat. § 211.20 (1953).
13. Minn. Stat. § 211.33 (1953).
14. Minn. Stat § 211.40 (1953).
15. Minn. Stat § 211.38 (1953). Under this section, conviction of an
elected federal or state legislator does not result in forfeiture of the election
by court order, but the court's adjudication of guilt is forvarded in certificate
form to the presiding officer of the appropriate legislative body. Legislative
bodies are the exclusive judges of the elections of their members.
16. Minn. Stat. § 208.01 (1953). The period is limited within which
contest proceedings may be brought. Minn. Stat § 211.35 (1953).
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an advantage 7 over the opposing candidate who has only enough
for minimum expenditures but whose resources are not completely
inadequate. 8 The poorer candidate is then faced with the alterna-
tives of either suffering the disadvantage, or attempting to raise
additional funds, the solicitation of which tends to involve commit-
ments agaipst the public interest.19
A few other reasons advanced for limits on campaign spending
seem to have less merit. It has been suggested that limitations en-
courage less wealthy persons to become candidates ;20 however,
candidates lacking the large amount of money needed to carry on a
modern campaign are seriously handicapped whether expenditure
limits exist or not. 2' Another reason offered in support of political
spending limitations is that campaign resources exceeding legiti-
mate needs tend to be spent corruptly 22 But large expenditures are
not necessarily corrupt. For example, it is probable that any surplus
would be spent on mass media advertising.23 In any event, the most
direct way to prevert corrupt expenditures is by explicit prohibi-
tion.
24
EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING LEGISLATION
There is general agreement that existing legislation has failed to
limit campaign expenditures. 25 One of the reasons for this failure
is the inadequacy of the law enforcement machinery Elected law
enforcement officials have not enthusiastically enforced this legis-
lation,'26 nor have defeated candidates or private citizens often
17 While the amount of money spent in a campaign is not the sole
determiner of election outcome, it is an important factor. See Douglas, Ethics
in Government 71 (1952), Key, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 563. Lavish expendi-
tures may adversely affect the candidate. Cf. Overacker, Money in Elections
373 (1932).
18. Limitations are of little assistance to the candidate whose resources
are so slim that an adequate campaign is impossible. See Overacker, Presi-
dential Campaign Funds 18 (1946).
19. See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 17, at 69-71, Key, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 543-547, Young, Corrupt Practices in Elections in Wisconsin 1(numeographed study reported to the Judiciary Subcommittee of the Wis-
consin Legislative Council 1948).
20. See Sait, American Parties and Elections 564 (4th ed., Penniman,
1948).
21. See Overacker, Money in Elections 96 (1932).
22. See Sait, op. cit. so pra note 20, at 564.
23. See Bottomly, supra note I at 369-370.
24. See Overacker, Money in Elections 95 (1932).
25. See Key, op. cit. supra note 3, at 559; Overacker, Money ii Elections
348 (1932), Young, op. cit. spra note 19, at 2.
26. See Overacker, Money in Elections 350-353 (1932) , Young, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 12. This may be partially due to the difficulties of criminal
or contest proceedings. See, e.g., Overacker, Money in Elections 356-362
(1932) (difficulties arising in contesting the nomination and election of Wis-
consin Governor Walter J. Kohler) Also, a law enforcement officer may be
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brought proceedings contesting the election of successful candi-
dates.2 7 Moreover, legislation -providing the defeated candidate
with an incentive for bringing an election contest by permitting him
to replace the winmnig candidate if the contest is successful has
been held unconstitutional.28 For these reasons, contest proceedings
or criminal prosecutions for corrupt practices act violations are
rare.
2 9
But perhaps a more fundamental reason for the failure of exist-
ing legislation to limit campaign expenditures is that a candidatema esy '- id complying with campaign expense ceilings by
may easily a$oid opyn ihcmag xes elnsb
merely establishing "independent" committees which ostensibly
operate without his direct authorization.30 In some states this re-
sult follows from statutes designed to limit only what the candi-
date himself spends, but several states,31 including Minnesota,3-
have established limits applicable to all expenditures "by or on
behalf" of a candidate. However this type of statute has been
generally construed so that it also limits only those expenditures
authorized by the candidate.3 3 On an appeal from proceedings in
which the election of a county commissioner had been successfully
contested, this narrow construction of the Minnesota statute was
adopted in Mariette v. Murray.3 4 The trial court had declared the
election forfeited on the basis of a finding that a "voluntary political
committee," which had incurred expenditures substantially in ex-
cess of the legal limits assigned to the candidate, was a subterfuge
to avoid the Corrupt Practices Act, being in fact the candidate's
reluctant to prosecute a candidate from his own party. See Sait, op. cit. vtpra
note 20, at 567. Failure to prosecute may also result from a sense of cama-
raderie among elected politicians. See Bottomly, supra note 1, at 378.
27. The losing candidate has little to gain from contesting an election
and runs the risk of being branded a "poor loser." See Overacker, Money in
Elections 353 (1932). Private citizens are unwilling to go to the expense or
incur the publicity attendant upon contest proceedings. See Young, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 12.
28. E.g., McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S. NV. 303 (1918).
29. See Overacker, Money in Elections 350-352 (1932) ; McCall, History
of Texas Election Laws, 9 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. XVI, XXXIII (1952).
30. See note 43 infra and text thereto.
31. Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 1952-1953
80-81 (1952).
32. See note 4 siupra.
33. State ex reL. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. XV. 895(1930), Kommers v. Palagi, 111 Mont. 293, 108 P 2d 208 (1940) (by impli-
cation), see Daniell v. Gregg, 97 N. H. 452, 455, 91 A. 2d 461, 463 (1952).
Proof that the candidate or his agents authorized disbursements is apparently
required to charge expenditures to the candidate under the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act See Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 270-275 (1921)(concurring opinion). For a general discussion of the cases relating to tlis
issue, see Best, Judicial Dectsions Affecting the Corrupt Practices Low, Sen.
Doc. No. 203, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 17-23 (1940).
34. 185Minn. 620,242 M W 331 (1932).
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personal committee. Even though there was substantial evidence of
collusion between the candidate and the committee,36 the supreme
court reversed this finding," asserting that a candidate may be
charged only with expenditures which he has directly authorized and
that knowledge and approval of a committee's expenditures is
insufficient to charge the candidate with its disbursements.
The Minnesota court has restricted the application of spending
limits in other ways. In construing the Minnesota statute fixing
disbursement ceilings at a percentage of the salary of the office to
which a candidate aspires, the court defined "salary" to include
"fees" earned by a sheriff.37 In another Minnesota case, it was
held that a person is not a candidate before officially filing his
affidavit of intention to run for political office, and therefore cannot
be charged with expenditures made prior to that time.3 8
As a result of inadequate enforcement machinery and narrow
court interpretation, 39 existing legislation has failed to limit ex-
penditures and thus to achieve any of the purposes for which legis-
lation was enacted.
But the objection to present legislation goes beyond failure to
achieve its purposes. Extremely low expenditure limits provided
by state4 ' and federal 4l statutes present candidates and political
parties with alternatives of either conducting a feeble campaign or
evading the law 42 Therefore, to avoid these limits candidates and
party organizations conspire to organize independent committees
which are not limited in the amount they may spend.43 This reverses
35. The evidence established, inter alia, that (1) the committee had
been formed m the courthouse in which the contestee had his office, (2) the
secretary of the committee and most of the members were comity employees
directly under the candidate's control, and, (3) that the ads and literature
paid for by the committee consisted largely of letters and statements which
carried the candidate's name. Id. at 623, 242 N. W at 332.
36. The election was voided on other grounds.
37 Spokelyv. Haaven. 183 Minn. 467, 237 N. W 11 (1931)
38. State ex rel. Brady v. Bates, 102 Minn. 104, 112 N. W 1026 (1907)
39. If the cases are excluded in which the courts have found excessive
expenditures but where the main ground of ouster was vote buying or treat-
ing, see Charles v. Flanary, 192 Ky. 511. 233 S. W 904 (1921), Konners v.
Palagi, 111 Mont. 293, 108 P 2d 208 (1940) , State c.r rel. Stafford v. Good.
15 Ohio Cir. Rep. 386, 8 Ohio Cir. Dec. 401 (5th Cir. 1898), with the possible
exception of a case appealed on other grounds, Ross v. Crane, 291 Mass. 28.
195 N. E. 884 (1935), no cases were found where excessive expenditure was
the main ground of contest proceedings and the contest was successful.
40. See Key, op. cit. supra note 3, at 561, Young, op cit. supra note 19.
at 2. For ceilings set by Minnesota statute see note 4 supra.
41. See Lederle, Political Committee Expenditures and the Hatch Act.
44 Mich. L. Rev. 294, 297 (1945) (" 'utterly unrealistic' and positively harm-
ful").
42. See Key, op. ct. supra note 3, at 561.
43. Cf. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 7 at 75 Young. op. cit. supra note
19, at 2 Lederle, supra note 41, at 298.
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the normal practice, for, in the absence of ceilings on campaign
spending, the formation of independent committees is discouraged
because they are hard to control and may compete w ith the candidate
or party in the quest for funds.4" The establishment of these inde-
pendent committees results in dispersion of campaign financing
which adversely affects public disclosure regulations in several
ways.45 Independent committees are apt to maintain less accurate
financial records than established party committees and often fail
to file financial statements 4 6 Further, the reports of these numerous
spending agencies require extensive analysis if their significance is
to be understood,47 and absent such an analysis, the many reports
filed by the various committees confuse the voters and may lead to
inaccurate conclusions.4 8
Existing legislation has caused other undesirable results. The
authority and responsibility of political parties has been weakened
through the establishment of independent committees formed to
avoid limits placed on party committee expenditures ;9 scrupulous
candidates are placed at a disadvantage by adhering to the estab-
lished spending limits ;50 the spectacle of continual evasion leads to
disrespect of the law ;51 and it would seem that progress toward
meaningful campaign fund regulation is deterred because gullible
persons believe that the total amount spent in a campaign is actual-
ly limited.
THE PROBLEM OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE EXPENDITURE
LIMITATIONS
Mlany scholars have urged that existing legislation be revised to
achieve effective limits on campaign spending.52 In addition to pro-
44. See Sen. Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945). Normally
one principal independent committee, to which expenditure limits do not
apply, raises and spends the bulk of a candidate's money. See Douglas, op.
cit. supra note 17, at 75. This evidences the tendency to centralize in the
absence of spending ceilings.
45. Virtually all states reqmre some form of public disclosure of cam-
paign financing. Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 1952-
1953 80-81 (1952).
46. See Lederle, supra note 41, at 298.
47. See ibid.
48. See Young, op. cit. rupra note 19, at 14.
49. See id. at 5-6; Rep. of Comm. on Political Parties, Am. Pol. Sci.
Ass'n, Toward a More Responsiblc Two-Party System, 44 Am. Pol. Sea.
Rev. (supplement) 75 (1950).
50. See Overacker, Money in Elections 348 (1932).
51. See Young, op. cit. supra note 19, at 13.
52. See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 17, at 73; Sailt, Campaign Expendi-
tures, 23 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 47, 52-54 (1929), Note, Statutory Regulation
of Political Campaign Funds, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1259, 126-12697 (1953).
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viding for adequate enforcement machinery,5 13 such legislation must
fulfill two essential requirements (1) limits must be set at a
reasonable level, and (2) authority for all expenditures in a candi-




One of the basic objections to establishing limits on camnpaign
spending is the absence of scientific criteria for determining what is
a reasonable ceiling on expenditures.55 If set too high, limits serve
no purpose, and if too low, candidates will attempt to avoid the
law If the law is sufficiently pervasive so that such avoidance is
prevented, limits set at too low a level will prevent the electorate
from becoming adequately informed, and such limits may be invali-
dated as a violation of free speech."
Proponents of fixed limitations suggest that reasonable linits
be fixed at a ceiling determined by information obtained by remov-
ing statutory ceilings on campaign spending but requiring dis-
closure of all campaign financing. 57 But levels set on the basis of
past campaigns are objectionable for several reasons. They do not
reflect a substantial advantage one candidate may have over his
opponent by virtue of newspaper support,5 incumbency, or sup-
53. Most proposals for improving enforcement of finance regulations
provide for an agency with power to investigate the accuracy of filed financial
statements. See Overacker, Money in Elections 391, 393 (1932) , Young. op
cit. supra note 19, at 15, Emory, supra note 3, at 254. The same type of
agency has been proposed as an aid to enforcement of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Prwileges and
Elections of the Committee on Rules and Administration, United States
Senate, on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Corrupt Practices let.
82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 12 (1952).
54. These are generally recognized requirements. Cf. Douglas. op. cit.
supra note 17, at 76, Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds 64-65 (1946) ,
Sait, op. cit. supra note 20, at 564.
55. There is no scientific measure of what a reasonamble or "fair" cam-
paign costs, Emory, supra note 3, at 258, therefore this determination is
essentially a moral judgment. See Lederle, supra note 41, at 297
56. One of the reasons given by the Wisconsin court in upholding linita-
tions was that other persons could spend any amount in the candidate's be-
half. See State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 566-572, 228
N. W 895, 912-914 (1930).
57 See Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1259, 1269 (1953) , Cf. Douglas, op
cit. supra note 17, at 76-77
58. Newspaper support is generally considered an important factor in a
political campaign. See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 17, at 71 Overacker,
Presidential Campaign Funds 18 (1946)
59. An incumbent may enjoy several important advantages. Patronage
may be used to obtain personal services from government employees. See
Douglas, op. cit. supra note 17, at 71. Congressmen may use the franking
privilege and extend remarks in the Congressional Record. See Key, op cit.
supra note 3 at 542.
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port from a political party or non-party organization,60 nor are
limits easily adjusted to accommodate fluctuations in campaign
expenses. Thus, limits lag behind constantly increasing campaign
costs,61 and are not responsive to the increased expenditures of an
especially hard fought campaign. In the same manner, limits fixed
on the basis o-fthe cost of a typical campaign are set too high to
serve any purpose when a campaign is substantially less expensive,
as during a depression 2 or a low-interest campaign. Finally, since
legislatures have failed to revise present limits to conform to realistic
campaign costs,63 newly-determined limitations may likewise be
permitted to become obsolete.
Centralized Authority
As the candidate may avoid responsibility for all expenditures
he has not authorized, 64 an over-all expenditure limit is unenforce-
able unless authority is centralized in the candidate for all sums
spent in his behalf. 65 This is achieved by subjecting to a fine or
imprisonment or both anyone who spends any money in a candi-
date's behalf without first receiving his approval0 0 Centralizing
authority in the candidates for all expenditures in support of his
candidacy also aids enforcement of other campaign finance regula-
tions,67 and preventsi dispersion of spending among several inde-
pendent committees which hinders efforts to provide voters with
meaningful campaign finance information.
However, as a person failing to receive the candidate's ap-
proval is prohibited from making any expenditures to aid the can-
didate of his choice, the validity of vesting a candidate with such
60. Candidates with political party support have the advantage of party
workers and financial support, see Douglas, op. cit..mtpra note 17, at 66-68,
and savings are made by candidates who campaign jointly on a party ticket.
See Key, op. cit. supra note 3, at 532.
61. Costs of traditional forms of campaigning are increasing, but poli-
ticians are also finding it necessary to purchase more mass media advertising.
See Young, op. cit. supra note 19, at 2.
62. Campaign expenditures can be expected to drop substantially during
a depression. See Overacker, Cam paign Funds in a Depression Year, 27 Am.
Pol. Sc. Rev. 769, 770-771 (1933).
63. See notes 40 and 41 supra and text thereto.
64. The courts have refused to hold the candidate responsible except
for expenditures which he has authorized. See note 33 sipra.
65. Cf. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 17, at 76; Ovpracker, Money in
Elections 346 (1932) ; Bottomly, stpra note 1, at 366-367
66. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 99.161 (4) (a), (7), 10427(1) (Supp.
1954).
67. Cf. Young op. cit. sitpra note 19, at 14. Contributions from illegal
sources are more easily controlled by centralizing authority. See Smith v.
Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. 1953).
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authority raises a constitutional issue of free speech.0 8 The argu-
ment that prohibiting expenditures not authorized by the candidate
violates freedoms protected by the Fourteenth Amendment", is
based on several cases invalidating statutes or ordinances vesting
public officials with discretionary power to prohibit distribution of
literature, ° solicitation of funds for religious purposes,71 or use of
public streets, buildings, or parks for meetings,7 2 or the right to
use loudspeakers.7" But these cases seem dissimilar in that the
ordinances and statutes invalidated were designed to cope with
fairly limited police problems, 74 which would not appear to justify
the broad power to prohibit basic freedoms which these laws vested
in the officials. Hence, legislation designed to meet like problems
has been upheld when narrowly construed by the state courts."0
On the other hand, the object of legal regulation of campaign
funds is to preserve popular control of government which the courts
have considered sufficiently important to, justify limitations on
campaign spending,76 and prohibitions against political contribu-
tions by labor unions77 and corporations."8
68. See Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1259, 1267 (1953) , 67 Harv. L. Rev.
887 (1954). This type of control was held unconstitutional in Finlay v. Ervin,
1 Fla. Supp. 198 (Cir. Ct. 1952), re7/d, 64 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1953)
69. Freedoms protected by the First Amendment are secured to all
persons by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U. S. 296, 303 (1940)
70. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 157-159, 163-165 (1939)
71. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940)
72. Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951) (streets) , Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) (public streets,
buildings, or parks).
73. Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948)
74. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948) (loudspeaker
noise) , Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (regulation of solicita-
tion), Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496(1939) (promote convenience and order on public property)
75. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 (1953) , Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941) With respect to the laws invalidated as
violating free speech, the Court seemed primarily concerned with the "over-
breadth" of discretion vested in the public official which empowered him to
deprive of their First Amendment freedoms persons whose activities may
have little relation to the evil which the law sought to prevent. See Bernard.
Avoidance of Constitutional Issues m the United States Supreme Court"
Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 261, 277-282 (1951).
76. Adams v. Lansdon, 18 Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280 (1910) , State ex rel.
La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W 895 (1930)
77 United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 79 F Supp. 516(D. Conn. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F 2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949),
American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S. W 2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945). Contra. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69
N. E. 2d 115 (1946), see United States v. Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, 335 U. S. 106, 129-155 (1948) (concurring opinion)
78. United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163(XW.D. Pa. 1916).
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As centralizing authority in the candidate is necessary for effec-
tive control of campaign funds,-9 it would seem that a court would
be justified in holding that the critical need to protect elections
from the dangerous influence of uncontrolled campaign spending
warranted vesting the candidate with authority to prohibit expendi-
tures in his behalf.80 This contention is strengthened by Smith v.
Erzjn,sl in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld a statute 2
requiring approval of the candidate's agent before an expenditure
could be made in his behalf. The supreme court accepted the trial
court's reasoning that the importance of regulating campaign funds
justified this restriction on the right to spend money in a candidate's
behalf and therefore was n6t a violation of free speech protections
found in the state constitution.
However, such a statute must be narrowly drawn so that its
restrictions affect only political contributions in the narrow sense
of expenditures explicitly in support of a candidate. As the right of
persons effectively to present their views on community issues is
fundamental to free speech,8 3 a statute empowering the candidate
to prohibit expenditures made for defending or opposing public
policies would probably be unconstitutional. This issue was raised
in State v. Pierce4 under a Wisconsin statute which required that
all expenditures for "political purposes" be spent through estab-
lished political parties and candidates. The court held that the statute
violated free speech protections found in the state constitution after
construing the act as empowering candidates or political parties
with authority to prevent independent persons from spending
money to urge their views on governmental policy
In view of this constitutional restriction narrowly limiting a
candidate's authority to the prohibition of expenditures made enx-
79. See note 65 siupra and text thereto.
80. See Smith v. Ervin, 1 Fla. Supp. 202, 205 (Cir. Ct. 1952), State v
Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 621-625, 158 N. W. 696, 699-700 (1916) (dissenting
opinion) ; if. United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 79 F Supp.
516, 522 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F 2d 854 (2d Cir.
1949) ; see Overacker, oney in elections 331-332 (1932). The right of politi-
cal participation can be restricted to accommodate other countervailing com-
munity interests. United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell,
330 U. S. 75 (1946) (statute upheld preventing federal employees from
taking "any active part in political management or m political campaigns").
The absence of other acceptable alternatives to effective campaign fund
regulation, which do not restrict freedoms, may affect a court's decision. Cf.
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S. 106, 149
(1948) (concurring opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306
(1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164 (1939).
81. 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953).
82. Fla. Stat Ann. § 99.161 (Supp. 1954).
83. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-106 (1940).
84. 163 Wis. 615, 158 N. W 696 (1916).
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plicitly in his behalf, it is improbable that legislation could be drawn
which effectively prevents circuitous avoidance of established limits.
When spending limits have been reached, interest groups may in-
directly aid the candidate by making expenditures advocating the
general policies which the candidate favors.8 5 Independent or non-
party groups can be established for the same purpose.80 Also, unions
and corporations can probably make large expenditures advising
their union membership or stockholders of the danger or advantage
of particular candidates.
8 7
In addition two factors combine to suggest that new loopholes
may be found in a revised system of statutory limits (1) the keen
competition between candidates forces them to look for means of
avoiding the spending ceilings, 88 and (2) the courts, as with pre-
vious statutory attempts to limit or prohibit expenditures for politi-
cal purposes, 89 may narrowly construe revised limits to permit
avoidance of campaign expenditure ceilings.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that existing legislation has failed to limit expendi-
tures. Moreover, efforts to revise such legislation so as to achieve
enforceable ceilings on campaign spending would seem inadvisable
because of the improbability that reasonable limits could be deter-
mined or maintained, or that legislation could be drawn which
could not be avoided. Unless these obstacles can be overcome, ex-
penditure ceilings are unfair to the scrupulous candidate, weaken
85. Large sums are now spent for such "institutional" advertising. See
Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1259, 1273 (1953). A\s to the variety of ways 'public
education" can be carried on to aid a particular candidate see Key, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 555.
86. The defendant charged with having spent funds for "political pur-
poses" in the Pierce case was a member of the Home Rule and Taxpayers
League. See Overacker, Money in Elections 332 (1932).
87 See United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335
U. S. 106, 121 (1948)
88. Cf. Young, op. cit. supra note 19, at 2.
89. For a discussion of the narrow interpretation placed on statutes
limiting expenditures, see text at notes 30-38 supra. Limitations under the
English statute controlling election funds have recently been construed to
include only expenditures " supporting a particular candidate or candi-
dates in a particular constituency. " R v. Tronoh Mines, Ltd., [19521 1
All E. R. 697, 700 (Central Crim. Ct.). Thus an expenditure openly urging
election of all Conservatives was not chargeable to a particular Conservative
candidate. The federal prohibition against union political contributions has
been construed to permit substantial political spending. See United States v.
Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S. 106 (1948) (union news-
papers may be used to support partisan political candidates), United States
v. Painters Local No. 481, 172 F 2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949) (support of candi-
date by purchase of radio and newspaper advertising upheld) , United States
v. Construction & General Laborers Local Union No. 264, 101 F Supp. 869
(W.D. Mo. 1951) (hiring workers for general campaigning upheld)
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party responsibility, and, by obscuring information on campaign
financing, prevent voters from knowing how much a candidate has
spent and from whom he has accepted financial support.
For many years scholars have urged that limits be removed and
that primary emphasis be placed on public disclosure of the facts
of campaign financing.90 The results of a Florida statute9 -- one of
the first attempts to remove legal limits and establish centralized
authority92-- seems to vindicate this position. Upheld by the Florida
Supreme Court,93 this new law has resulted in accurate and com-
prehensive financial information.' Candidates closely watched their
opponents' financial reports to uncover violations of the law; thus,
a type of "self-policing" has resulted from this statute which forces
disclosure of pertinent financial information. 5 But perhaps the
most important achievement is that "[f]or the first time in the
history of Florida politics, the electorate was given a comprehensive
.picture of money in a[n] ... election." D0
The Minnesota Legislature might well re-examine the efficacy
of retaining existing campaign fund regulations in the light of
Florida's experience.
90. Overacker, Mloney in Elections 348 (1932) ;Bottomly, smpra note 1,
at 369-370; Emory, stpra note 3, at 252, 258-259; McHenry, .rupra note 3,
at 126.
91. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.161 (Supp. 1954).
92. Texas recently removed spending limitations. See 9 Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 14.08 (1952) (Historical Comment). Centralized authority
for campaign expenditures is also provided. 9 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
14.04(d) (1952). California also removed statutory limits, but failure to pro-
vide for centralized spending has reduced the effectiveness of the public
disclosure requirement See California Legis. Assembly, Interim Comm. on
Elections & Appointments, Purity of Election Laws 5 (1952).
93. Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953).
94. See Roady, Floridas New Campaign Expense Law and the 1952
Democratic Gubernatorial Primaries, 48 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 465, 476 (1954).
95. Id. at 475.
96. Id. at 476. Full publicity coverage of the filed financial reports was
given by the press agencies. Id. at 475-476.
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